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Recent Cases
C~mimAL LAW--INsANrrY--TEsT FOB CBIvnNAL BEuSPONSIBILITY.-
Charles Freeman, a confirmed alcoholic and narcotics addict, was con-
victed on two counts of selling narcotics in violation of a federal
statute.' Through an informant, two federal narcotics agents arranged
to purchase heroin from Freeman. Unaware of the agents' identities,
the defendant on two separate occasions received money in exchange
for a substance which chemical analysis indicated to be heroin. In
denying responsibility for the substantive offense, Freeman alleged
that at the time of the transaction he possessed insufficient capacity
and will to be held responsible for the criminality of his acts. Pursuant
to these allegations and in light of precedent, the district court in-
structed the jury to employ the M'Naghten rule2 as the appropriate
test of insanity. The conviction resulted in Freeman's being sentenced
to concurrent terms of five years on each count. Held: Reversed. The
new test for determining criminal responsibility shall be whether at
the time of committing the act the defendant, as a result of mental
disease or defect, lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his act or to conform his conduct to requirements of
law.3 United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966).
Absent the issue of criminal responsibility, the facts of the Free-
man case were but routine. The importance of this decision rests on
the fundamental notion of criminal justice: the criminal law should
truly reflect the moral sense of the community.4
Since the United States Supreme Court has refused 5 to establish a
'21 U.S.C. §§ 178-74 (1909).
2 M'Naghten's rule states that:
a defense of insanity can be established only when the party accused
was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as
not to know the nature and quality of the act he committed, or if he did
know it, he did not know he was doing wrong.
M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark and Fin. 200 (1843).
3 Section 4.10 of the Model Penal Code [hereinafter cited as "ALI rule!] as
formulated by the American Law Institute reads as follows:
a person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial
capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to con-
form his conduct to requirements of law.
4 357 F.2d at 607-08.5 Although there are arguments that the Supreme Court has indicated its
approval of M'Naghten in Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895), and in
Davis v. United States, 165 U.S. 373 (1897), the court in Freeman attempted to
distinguish the reasoning of these two cases.
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uniform standard of criminal responsibility in federal proceedings,6
the courts of appeal in the various circuits have wide discretion in
ascertaining the principle which they believe best satisfies the dictates
of justice in criminal insanity trials. Taking note of this issue, the
Second Circuit in Freeman, in an effort to support its transition, cited
recent cases in two other federal circuits where the courts abandoned
the M'Naghten rule in favor of a position similar to that adopted by the
Second Circuit.7 While it is true that M'Naghten remains the test in
the majority of state and federal jurisdictions, 8 the court in this case
acknowledged the need for a change. The constant distinctions and
refinements continually being made in the field of criminal law require
that questions previously answered be re-asked, and new answers
must be brought forth if the concept of ordered liberty so pertinent to
our system of justice is to be maintained.9
The majority opinion made an articulate analysis in disposing of
M'Naghten and implementing the new rule. Operating on the as-
sumption that the three purposes of the criminal law-rehabilitation,
deterrence, and retribution-are best served when the truly irrespon-
sible are given psychiatric treatment rather than imprisonment, the
court expressed doubt as to its ability to attain justice under
M'Naghten.10
Ultimately, the court's arguments against M'Naghten are derived
from one basic premise-its focus upon only the cognitive aspect of
the personality." Such a limitation has had two detrimental results.
First, it does not allow a jury to identify those who can distinguish
between right and wrong but cannot control behavior. Consequently,
there is no recognition of any degrees of incapacitation. Either the
6357 F.2d at 613. See also, Moore, Jr., M'Naghten Is Dead-Or Is It?, 3
HousToN L. BEv. 58 (1965), which suggests that the Supreme Courts inaction is
not mere coincidence, but is motivated by a desire to encourage the circuits to
discuss and develop alternative tests before making a definitive ruling.
7The Third Circuit, in United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir.
1961), adopted all of the ALI rule except the part which reads "appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct .. . The Tenth Circuit, in Wion v. United States,
325 F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1963), adopted the ALI rule, but would add that thejury be instructed that to return a guilty verd;ct they must be convinced that the
defendant at the time of the act was mentally capable of knowing what he was
doing, was mentally capable of knowing that it was wrong, and was mentally
capable of contoig his conduct.
821 AM. Ju. Criminal Law § 33 (1965).
9 357 F.2d at 607.10 Id. at 615. See also, Allen, The Rule of the American Law Institute s
Model Penal Code, 45 MARQ. L. REv. 494, 496 (1962), which states that
the function of the test of criminal responsibility is to identify those
who, on a calm and sober view, must be regarded as ineligible for the
processes of criminal justice with their inherent, stigmatic and punitive
ingredients and who, therefore, must be conceived solely as the recipients
of care, custody and therapy.
11357 F.2d at 618. See BiGGs. THE GuImTY Mn 145 (1955).
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defendant knew right from wrong or he did not. Thus, many convicted,
mentally-ill offenders are imprisoned where psychiatric care was un-
available. The result has been the release of recidivists from prison
with society at their mercy.12 Secondly, M'Naghten implicitly shackled
the significance of expert testimony. Bather than explain the functions
of the mind, the psychiatrist had to confine his expression to an opinion
on defendant's capacity for determining right from wrong. The social
climate of Victorian England, the age in which M'Naughten's rule was
formulated, is a great contrast to the complex society of today. Great
strides made in psychiatry and psychiatric treatment are too important
to restrict the psychiatrist to a mere opinion on one's ability to de-
termine right from wrong. Parenthetically, the ultimate deciders of
responsibility-juries-should not be deprived of information vital to
final verdict.' 3 Indeed, the court in Freeman accuses M'Naghten of
being a sham.14 Supporting this was the suggestion that the principle
behind M'Naghten, namely, that defect of cognition as a consequence
of mental disease is the primary factor in determining legal insanity,
had probably never been other than a legal fiction.15
In lieu of M'Naghten, the court sought to adopt a more workable
rule. After a brief discussion rejecting two other tests, the "irresis-
tible impulse"' 0 and the Durham rule,17 the court said that the Ameri-
can Law Institute rule, while not perfect, was more adaptable in ap-
plying the principles of a fluid and evolving science' 8 to a complex
area of criminal law. One may better appreciate such a conclusion
after a review of the historical development of this test.
In 1953 the American Law Institute [hereinafter referred to as
ALI] began an exhaustive study of the problem of criminal responsibi-
lity. Under the direction of noted scholars, 19 leading legal and medical
minds, the Institute undertook to draft an acceptable rule. Debates,
12 357 F.2d at 618.
13 Id. at 620.
14 Id. at 619.15 Diamond, From M'Naghten. to Currens and Beyond, 50 CAxar. L. REv.
189 (1962). Cf. United States v. Baldi, 192 F.2d 540, 568 (3d Cir. 1951)
(dissenting opinion).
10 The court in Freeman disposed of the "irresistible impulse" test on the
basis that psychiatrists question the existence of such an impulse. Also, the
court stated that the term was too narrow and carried the misleading implication
that a crime committed impulsively must have been perpetrated in a sudden and
explosive fit. 357 F.2d at 620.
17While recognizing that the Durham rule may have been vast improvement
over M'Naghten, the court did not accept it because it failed to give the fact-
finder any standard by which to measure the competency of the accused. 357 F.2d
at 621-22.
Is 357 F.2d at 623.
19 Such scholars included Herbert Wechsler of Columbia University as Chief
Reporter and Louis B. Schwartz of the University of Pennsylvania as Co-Reporter.
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arguments, drafts, and re-drafts on the subject of criminal responsibil-
ity preceded the adoption of the final rule. The final draft was not
accepted until nine years after the research and exploration had
begun20 This rule represents the first major attempt to draft an in-
sanity rule through the combined efforts of professionals closely
associated with the subject. Freeman represents the first major federal
jurisdiction to adopt the test in toto.
The court's reasoning in adopting the ALI rule clearly reflects the
rationale behind the M'Naghten rejection. Rather than focus on one
particular aspect of personality, the Model Penal Code formulation
recognizes that mental disease may impair the functioning of the mind
in numerous ways.
Concomitantly, the rule espoused insights from psychiatry that
absolutes are ephemeral and variations inevitable.2' Furthermore, the
court emphasized that meaningful psychiatric testimony is possible
under the new test. Thus, an "inquiry based on meaningful psycho-
logical concepts can be pursued,"22 which should result in the use of
terms precise enough to provide the jury with workable standards
when instructed by the judge.23 The separate branches of the test,
phrased alternatively, will protect from criminal sanctions those per-
sons mentally irresponsible for their actions. Finally, the court, making
no pretensions that the ALI rule is faultless, indicated that the genius
of the common law system has been its responsiveness to changing
time. The law must serve the needs of the present while drawing from
the past. Psychiatry has become an important branch of modem
medicine; the development of a legal principle should reflect such
evolution.2 4
Insanity tests for judging criminal responsibility currently provoke
as much controversy as any other problem in criminal law.2 5 Whether
or not Freeman will initiate a trend towards total adoption of the ALI
rule remains to be seen. That there is a great need for a change in the
area of criminal responsibility has been repeatedly manifested.26 Per-
20 357 F.2d at 622.
= ibid.
22 Id. at 623.
23 Note the following caveat: "I believe that mental disease is a complex and
intricate matter and we cannot make it simple and understandable to everyonejust by inventing simple words or phrases to describe it." 112 CONG. REc. 2855
(1966) (Remarks of Senator Thomas J. Dodd).
24 357 F.2d at 624-625.
!25 Commonwealth v. Chester, 337 Mass. 702, 150 N.E.2d 914 (1958): "In-
deed, it is probably no exaggeration to say that this sube ct is receiving more at-
tention today than any other subject in the criminal law."2 6 Gum-cmm & WrmoFErN. PsYcHIATnY AND THA LAW 415 (1952). See
also, United States v. Malafronte, 357 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1966); People v. Krug-
(Continued on next page)
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haps the time is ripe for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari to an
insanity case. By adopting a standard, the Court could put an end to
the divergence of opinion existing among the federal courts as to which
best satisfies justice. Many state courts would also be persuaded by a
Supreme Court decision. Until the Court adopts a position on this
issue, the confusion and complexity will continue to intensify.
Joe Bill Campbell
CRM NAL LAw-LAwYEBs-FES-ATroRNEY's FEES FOR INDiGENT CRIM-
NAL DEFENDANTs.-The circuit court appointed counsel to represent a
defendant in a Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure 11.42 motion
proceeding. The motion was denied. Counsel moved the court for
allowance of a fee, to be paid by the county or other public source,
for his services in the proceeding. The motion of counsel was denied.
Both motions were appealed together. Held: Affirmed. While there is
merit in the proposition that assigned counsel should be compensated,
in the absence of legislation providing funds for this purpose, attorneys
will be required to devote their time and knowledge to the representa-
tion of indigents in criminal cases as a fulfillment of a professional
duty. Warner v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1966).
Appellant-counsel, relying on a decision of the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Oregon,' argued that the public use of
his services and knowledge by the court was an unlawful deprivation
of property without just compensation under the fifth amendment of
the United States Constitution. The Oregon federal court said
that while, historically, the privileges of the attorney in society once
required him to represent the indigent without compensation, the
special privileges of his position no longer exist.
The production of witnesses for an indigent defendant is a phase of
due process-the supplying of a transcript of proceedings to an indigent
defendant through services, expertise, and facilities of the court reporter
is a phase of due process, as is the supplying of mental and physical
examination through the services and expertise of a physician, and so
must also be a supplying of a license, time, expertise, office facilities and
expense of an attorney for the indigent. The supplying (of an attorney
at every stage] . . . is a public purpose. 2
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
man, 141 N.W.2d 39 (Mich. 1966) (citing Freeman); Commonwealth v. Ahearn,
218 A.2d 561, 572 (Pa. 1966) (dissenting opinion).
'Dillon v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 487 (D. Ore. 1964).
2 Id. at 493.
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